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ABSTRACT :
At the end of the nineties, many developing countries featured an open capital market and relied heavily
on dollar-debt financing of their economy. This paper analyses whether, in this context, clean floating
can be a sustainable policy choice. The model is cast as a game between successive generations of
investors who decide whether they buy or not the debt of a representative firm. The exchange rate is
subject to random shocks, which makes uncertain the private sector’s solvency. We show that a small
risk of insolvency would bring about a much larger risk of illiquidity. A rational expectation equilibrium
without default can be put forward only in the highly improbable case when the currency is extremely







Fin des années 90, un grand nombre de pays en voie de développement présentaient un marché des
capitaux ouvert et une dette en devises significative. Cet article s’interroge sur la compatibilité d’un
régime de changes flexibles avec cette structure financière. Le modèle prend la forme d’un jeu qui
oppose des générations successives d’investisseurs, amenés à décider de renouveler ou non leurs
engagements. Le taux de change est soumis à des chocs aléatoires, qui rendent incertaine la solvabilité du
secteur privé. Nous démontrons qu’un faible risque d’insolvabilité peut provoquer un risque d’illiquidité
très important. Un équilibre à anticipations rationnelles sans défaut peut être mis en évidence seulement
dans le cas peu probable où la monnaie nationale est fortement surévaluée. Il semblerait que les changes
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Abstract
At the end of the nineties, many developing countries featured an open capital market and relied heavily
on dollar-debt ﬁnancing of their corporate sector. This paper points to some hidden risks that may
come, in this context, with the decision to increase the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate. In the model,
successive generations of investors must decide whether or not to buy the debt of a representative ﬁrm.
The exchange rate is subject to random shocks, which make the private sector’s solvency uncertain. By
successively eliminating dominated strategies in what can be described as an expectation game, it turns
out that a small risk of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity. These ﬁndings call
for a more cautious transition to ﬂexible exchange rates than currently required by international ﬁnancial
organizations.
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Starting from the mid nineties, emerging economies have been facing a new wave of ﬁnancial
instability which came about against the background of the ongoing liberalization of international
movements of capital. In the interval between the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and the Argentinean
140 billion dollar debt default of 2002, many experts claimed that only “corner” exchange rate
regimes — either the irrevocably pegged or the fully ﬂexible exchange rate — would be able to rule
out ﬁnancial crises in the developing world (see the discussion in Frankel, 1999; Fischer, 2001).
A f t e rt h eA r g e n t i n e a nc r i s i s—ac o u n t r yw h i c hu s e dt or u nas u p e r - ﬁxed exchange rate regime
backed by a currency board — the consensus of the day shifted in favor of the fully ﬂexible exchange
rate regime (Fischer, 2003). For instance, one can read in the IMF World Economic Outlook 2004:
“For the emerging market economies, moving toward more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes can help
mitigate the risk from currency crises that have characterized pegged exchange rate regimes”
(IMF, 2004, p.89). Or, listening to the managing director of the IMF, “Going forward, greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility would give countries more monetary control, facilitate the emergence of
more dynamic economies, and contribute to an orderly reduction of global imbalances” (De Rato,
2005, p.2).
Such a recommendation is, however, in contrast to early warnings against risks that may
come with the extreme volatility of the exchange rate under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime
(inter alia, Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). Countries with large
dollar denominated liabilities would be the most vulnerable, given that any currency depreciation
increases the debt value as measured in local currency units. Yet, the accumulation of massive
dollar denominated debt by developing countries is a basic stylized fact (Rogoﬀ, 1999; Eichengreen
and Hausmann, 1999; Calvo, 2002; Rajan, 2004).
This paper renews with this skeptical perspective, by focusing on the diﬃculties that may face
the corporate sector when a country decides to ﬂoat its exchange rate. It will be shown that when
ﬁrms have large dollar debts, a highly volatile exchange rate may bring about a signiﬁcant risk
1of illiquidity.1 Corporate dollar debt is an essential component of total foreign debt in many
developing regions. According to the World Bank Report on Global Development Finance 2003,
external borrowing accounted for about a third of corporate sector debt in Latin America and
Eastern Europe in 2001; the foreign debt of the corporate sector represented about a quarter of
the GDP in these regions; in East Asia, corporate dollar-debt represented 7% of their GDP at the
same time (World Bank, 2003).
The model is cast as a game between successive generations of international investors, asked to
roll over the corporate debt. Firms ﬁnance themselves by borrowing dollars, while their income is
denominated in domestic currency units. The showcase example is the real estate company which
provides rental housing. By assumption, the overall cost of default is very large, thus a ﬁrm will
resort to this extreme measure only when it faces a severe shortage of resources. Default may be
brought about by insolvency, that is, a situation where, after a sudden depreciation, the ﬁrm’s
income as converted into dollars does not suﬃce to pay for interest expenses. The risk of insolvency
stems from the uncertainty about the next period exchange rate, which makes uncertain the future
dollar income of the ﬁrm. Even if solvency is not at stake, today investors must also take into
account the possibility that, at the next period, the exchange rate will depreciate so much that
the next generation of investors will refuse to lend. The presence of this objective risk of illiquidity
narrows signiﬁcantly the range of parameters for which the no-default equilibrium is feasible. The
zero-default equilibrium solution is obtained by successively eliminating dominated strategies in
the expectation game. It turns out that a rational expectation equilibrium without default may
exist only if the debt-to-value ratio is extremely low. This result points to the importance of this
criterion in assessing the sustainability of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime and calls for a more
cautious transition to a ﬂexible exchange rate than currently required by the main international
organizations.
The analysis can be related to studies in public debt sustainability under income uncertainty.
In general, static models of public debt management present two stable equilibria, one favorable,
with a zero probability of default and low interest rates and another where default cannot be
1 Illiquidity refers here to the situation where investors refuse to roll over a company’s debt.
2avoided (e.g., Calvo, 1988; Masson, 1999; Cole and Kehoe, 2000). Romer (2001) argues that the
risk of default would increase in a multi-period setting, given that a ﬁrm may run out of cash if
the trust chain breaks and investors refuse to roll over the debt. In this vein, Besancenot et al.
(2004) provide a formal analysis of public debt within a intertemporal framework and show that
the sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio is much lower than a static model would imply. This paper
builds on their methodology to analyze the expectation formation mechanism, given a diﬀerent
source of uncertainty; in the problem at hand, the interaction between the risk of insolvency and
the risk of illiquidity is more complex.
Risks associated to dollar debt under a ﬁxed exchange rate have already been emphasized by
economists who studied the Asian crisis (inter alia: Krugman, 1999; Céspedes et al., 2000; Aghion
et al., 2001; Jeanne and Zettlemeyer, 2002). In the standard framework, ﬁrms and banks have
exogenously given dollarized liabilities, although their assets are denominated in the domestic
currency.2 In this context, a sudden devaluation would push up the value of foreign debt as
expressed in domestic currency units and bring about a balance sheet eﬀect: when the net worth
declines, ﬁrms put a brake on investment, which in turn depresses global demand and justiﬁes
further capital ﬂight. A variant of this balance sheet eﬀect is also at work in our paper: currency
depreciation is the origin of a small insolvency risk which, in turn, is the catalyst for a substantial
illiquidity risk.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces basic assumptions. Section 3
introduces the rational expectation equilibrium: we ﬁrst deﬁne the risk of insolvency, then show
how insolvency leads to illiquidity. Conditions necessary for existence of the no-default equilibrium
are then made explicit. The last section presents the conclusion.
2 Other economists focused on the rationale for issuing dollar debt (Calvo 2001; Caballero and Krishnamurthy,
2003; Cowan and Do, 2003; Jeanne, 2000; 2003).
32 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
The representative ﬁrm produces a non-tradable commodity. Its exogenously given output is worth
y local currency units per period.3 To ﬁnance its activity, the ﬁrm issues monoperiodic dollar
debt; each time t, it oﬀers bonds that will come to maturity at time t+1. T h ea m o u n to fd e b ta t
time t is denoted by Dt. The dollar-denominated interest rate over the period (t,t+1)is denoted
by trt+1. Let et denote the price of one foreign currency unit at moment t as measured in local
currency units (thus an increase in e is equivalent to a depreciation of the domestic currency).
With this notation, at time t+1, the budget constraint of the ﬁrm takes the standard form (both
terms are expressed in dollars):
Dt(1 +t rt+1) ≤
y
et+1
+ Dt+1, ∀t. (1)
The debt service (left hand term) is ﬁnanced by the ﬁrm’s income and by new debt. To keep the
model as simple as possible, in the following we assume that the debt stock does not vary in time:
Dt = Dt+1 = D. In this case, excess income is distributed as dividends and the deﬁc i tc a n n o tb e
ﬁnanced by a debt increase (i.e. investors refuse to play Ponzi games).4
By assumption, the cost of default is huge for the ﬁrm and its management. In other words,
a ﬁrm would never default on purpose; the only reason to implement this strategy is a lack of
resources. If ﬁnancial default does not happen, the ﬁrm would last forever. Successive generations
of investors are then asked to roll the debt over an inﬁnite time horizon.
2 . 2 E x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c s
Under a fully ﬂexible exchange rate regime the exchange rate is assumed to be determined by
market forces only. In general, economists acknowledge that under such an arrangement, the
exchange rate is subject to substantial short term volatility combined with a “glacial” rate at
which deviations from the long-term value tend to die out (Rogoﬀ, 1996). Many empirical analyses
3 On one hand, devaluation increases the price of imported goods relative to the price of the non-tradables, thus
would have a stimulating impact on demand for the non-tradable sector. On the other hand, devaluation depresses
investment via the balance sheet eﬀect. In this model, the two eﬀects oﬀset each other.
4 The case of a time varying debt in a closed economy was analyzed by Besancenot et al. (2004). Allowing for
this additional degree of freedom would not alter the main insights of the model.
4have shown that the random walk forecasting model of the exchange rate entails quite satisfactory
results and highly sophisticated models bring about only an incremental improvement. Moreover,
so far economists have not reached consensus about the right theoretical model of exchange rate
determination.5 Given this state of the art, in our paper we take a shortcut based on empirical
analysis, and merely assume that under clean ﬂoating the exchange rate follows the dynamics:
et+1 = Fλe
1−λ
t (1 +  t+1), with λ ∈ [0,1[. (2)
Here F stands for the fundamental value of the exchange rate, and  t+1 is a zero mean random
shock, with  t+1 ∈ [−A,A] and A<1 (this constraint merely rules out negative exchange rates).
The fundamental value F may be interpreted as a generic representation of the long-run equilib-
rium exchange rate; in our simple framework, F is a constant. For λ>0, after a shock, market
forces tend to bring the exchange rate back to its fundamental value. The larger λ,t h em o r e
rapidly convergence is achieved. If λ =0 , the exchange rate is a martingale. Empirical analyses
on the dynamics of exchange rates, building on log-forms of equation (2), support either the as-
sumption λ =0or λ positive but very small, consistent with a sluggish mean reverting process
(Berkowitz and Giorgianni, 2001; Rapach and Wohar, 2002; Herwartz and Reimers, 2002).
Without loss of generality, we can normalize F to unity. In this case, e can be interpreted as
the deviation of the exchange rate from the fundamental value. Equation (2) becomes:
et+1 =( et)1−λ (1 +  t+1). (3)
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i se q u a t i o n ,f o rλ>0 the deviation e may take a value in the closed interval
[(1 − A)1/λ,(1 + A)1/λ]; even if the adverse shock occurs forever, e cannot exceed (1 + A)1/λ. Of
course, in the special case λ =0 , the deviation may reach any positive value.
2.3 Investors’ strategy
Generations of investors come one after the other over an inﬁnite time horizon; each new generation
is asked to roll over the debt held by the previous generation. At any time t, the representative
investor has a two-fold strategy. In the ﬁrst place, he must decide on whether or not to buy the
5 On the random walk hypothesis, see the pioneering paper by Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983). See also the more
recent analyses by Flood and Rose (1995), Rogoﬀ (1996) and Neely and Sarno (2002).
5debt. If he decides to buy the new debt, at a second stage, he must post the interest rate at which
he is willing to hold this debt.
The strategy depends on the investor’s subjective probability that the ﬁrm will default on
its obligations at t +1 . Given that this default may be imposed on the ﬁrm by the behavior
of investors belonging to the generation t +1 , the model can be represented as ag a m eb e t w e e n
successive generations of investors who have to ﬁnance a third player, the ﬁrm. The latter has
only a passive role; it has no autonomous strategy, i.e. would never default on purpose.
Let tπt+1 denote the subjective probability that investors belonging to generation t attach
to the possibility of default at t +1(hereafter, π will denote a subjective probability, and Π an
objective probability).
Default is assumed to be complete, i.e., if the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy, investors cannot
recover any of their funds. Hence, denoting by i the international risk-free interest rate (on
a dollar denominated benchmark bond), the standard zero trade-oﬀ condition with risk-neutral
i n v e s t o r sw r i t e sa s :
(1 + i)=( 1+ t rt+1)(1 −t πt+1). (4)





The interest rate is a convex increasing function in the subjective probability of default, with
tπt+1 =0⇒t rt+1 = i. For any probability of default lower than one, there is a ﬁnite interest rate
for which investors agree to hold the debt. However, if investors believe that the probability of
default is equal to one, they refuse to roll over the debt.
2.4 The sequence of decisions; illiquidity and insolvency deﬁned
We consider the typical sequence of decisions between time t and t +1 .
Step 1. At time t,d e b tD is oﬀered to investors belonging to generation t of investors.
Step 2. Investors know et and the exchange rate dynamics. They estimate the risk of default,
then decide whether or not to hold this debt during the period (t,t +1 ) . If their subjective
probability of default is lower than one, they accept to hold the new debt and ask for an interest
6rate trt+1. This interest rate will include a default premium if the subjective probability of default
is positive. Then follows Step 3. However, if investors believe that the default will occur with
certainty at moment t +1 , they can only refuse to hold this debt. In such a case the ﬁrm cannot
ﬁnance its activity and is pulled out of the market at moment t. The game stops. In the following,
we refer to the situation when default is brought about by investors’ refusal to lend as the illiquidity
default.
Step 3. At moment t +1 , Nature picks a zero-mean shock  t+1 at random, which hits the
exchange rate. If the ﬁrm’s income allows payment for interest expenses, the game is played one
more time, starting with Step 1. If the ﬁrm does not have enough resources to pay for interest
expenses, it is forced to default (at moment t+1)and the game stops. The situation where default
is caused by a lack of income will be referred to as the insolvency default.
3 The rational expectations equilibrium
3.1 The insolvency risk of default
In order to deﬁne the risk of insolvency, let us ﬁrst assume that investors systematically agree on
buying the new debt, i.e., for the time being, the risk of illiquidity is neglected (we will come back
to this assumption later on). Thus, according to the budget constraint (1), a ﬁrm cannot meet its
obligations at t +1if the interest payment exceeds its income. The insolvency condition is:
y
et+1






Given the dynamics of the exchange rate (equation 3), and considering the lowest interest rate





< (1 + A)1/λ. In an equivalent way, taking








it will exist if λ =0 , since, in this case, the deviation can take any positive value.
In the following, in order to keep the model as simple as possible, λ is set at zero, that is,
we focus on the case where the exchange rate is a martingale. However, the main insights of the
model would not change if λ takes a small positive value (provided that the risk of insolvency is
positive).
7The objective probability of insolvency default at time t +1 , such as assessed at time t,i s
denoted by tΠS
t+1. Given condition (6), it is formally deﬁned as:
tΠS






























To obtain closed form solutions, in the following we assume that  t+1 is uniformly distributed on




















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f Φ(tπt+1,e t) < 0
1i f Φ(tπt+1,e t) > 1
Φ(tπt+1,e t) if else
. (11)
It should be remarked that the function Φ(,) is concave and increasing in tπt+1. It is also increasing
in et. We notice that Φ(1,−)=( 1+A)/2A>1,∀et. Function Φ(,) is therefore representative of a
family of curves increasing with tπt+1 and all converging to (1 + A)/2A for tπt+1 =1 . Therefore,
whatever the value of et the function tΠS
t+1 (,) will display a horizontal branch at tΠS
t+1 (,)=1
for some values of tπt+1 ≤ 1. Figure 1 shows the objective probability of insolvency default as a
function of tπt+1, for two values of et.
3.2 From insolvency to illiquidity
By deﬁnition, a Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is a ﬁxed point of the expectation up-
grading process. The REE implies that the subjective and objective probabilities of default coin-
cide. Focusing on the insolvency risk only, an REE is deﬁned for all couples (tπt+1,e t) satisfying
condition:
tπt+1 =t ΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t). (12)
8Let s0 denote the largest value of et for which a no-default REE can exist. The threshold s0 is
























This solution can be put forward graphically. Figure 1 displays the objective probability tΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t)
as a function of tπt+1 and considering et as a parameter: the lower curve is obtained for et = s0,
the upper curve is representative of an et value so that et >s 0. An REE obtains at the intersection
between the 45◦ line and the curve tΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t). We can remark that for et = s0 the no default
equilibrium is feasible indeed; it obtains at the origin, where tΠS
t+1 =t πt+1 =0 .( F o r et = s0
another equilibrium — representative of default — is also feasible, at point N, tΠS












Figure 1: REE and the insolvency risk of default
We can now state an important proposition.
Proposition 1 For all et >s 0, default is the only equilibrium outcome.
9Proof. A c c o r d i n gt od e ﬁnition (11), whatever et >s 0 and whatever tπt+1 ∈ [0,1[, the objective
probability of default is higher than the subjective one: tΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t) >t πt+1. Thus, for all
et >s 0, the only REE is tπt+1 =t ΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t)=1
At time t, if et >s 0, in equilibrium investors assess a unit probability of default. They thus
refuse to hold the ﬁrm’s debt, and the ﬁrm, facing a shortage of liquidity, is pulled out of the
market immediately. Notice that for et >s 0, the risk of insolvency (at time t +1 )brings about
illiquidity default (at time t). The illiquidity risk, so far neglected, must now be introduced.
3.3 The illiquidity risk of default
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rd e ﬁnition, illiquidity default is a situation where the ﬁrm’s default is brought
about by investors’ refusal to lend. Previous subsection has shown that whenever et >s 0, no
investors will hold the ﬁrm’s debt. Obviously, et >s 0,∀t is a suﬃcient condition of illiquidity
default. In particular, if et+1 >s 0,t h eﬁrm will default at time t +1 . Thus, investors belonging
to generation t must consider a second objective risk: the risk that at t+1the exchange rate et+1
might exceed s0, which will trigger the refusal to lend of the generation t +1of investors.
Let tΠL
t+1(s0,e t) denote this objective probability of illiquidity default:
tΠL
t+1(s0,e t)=P r [ et+1 >s 0 | et]
=P r [ et (1 +  t+1) >s 0]

















if et ∈]s0/(1 + A),s 0]
. (16)
The function tΠL
t+1(,) is increasing in et and is independent of π.
When several factors impact on the risk of default, the objective probability must reﬂect the
contribution of all these factors, according to the appropriate statistical measure. In this case, the
objective risk should incorporate both the insolvency and the illiquidity risk. Let tΠt+1 denote
10the overall objective probability of default.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t : 6
tΠt+1 =m a x
©
tΠS




Hence, the former deﬁnition of an REE (equation 12) should be generalized, to account for a
situation where either insolvency or illiquidity can provoke default. More precisely, a rational
expectation equilibrium occurs if the subjective probability of default matches the largest objective
probability consistent with this subjective probability. Couples (tπt+1,e t) consistent with an REE
should fulﬁll condition:
tπt+1 =m a x
©
tΠS
t+1 (tπt+1,e t), tΠL
t+1(s0,e t)
ª
∀tπt+1 ∈ [0,1]. (18)
The existence of an illiquidity risk signiﬁcantly narrows the range of et values consistent with a
REE featuring a zero risk of default. For instance, it was argued in the previous section that
for et = s0 the insolvency risk of default is zero. Yet due to the illiquidity risk of default,
tπt+1 =0cannot be an equilibrium for et = s0. Indeed, tΠL
t+1(s0,s 0)=0 .5, thus tπt+1 ≥ 0.5.
But for tπt+1 ∈ [0.5,1[ we have tΠS
t+1(tπt+1,s 0) >t πt+1, therefore the only feasible equilibrium
is tπt+1 =t Πt+1 =1 .
Graphically, for any et, the overall objective probability of default as a function of tπt+1
may be represented as the upper part of two curves, one of them representing the objective
probability of insolvency tΠS
t+1(tπt+1,e t) and the other representing the objective probability of
illiquidity default, tΠL
t+1(s0,e t). The objective probability of illiquidity default is independent
of the subjective probability; thus, it can be represented as a horizontal line. In Figure 2, the
black bold curve represents the objective probability for et = s0. The objective probability of
insolvency default is the same as in Figure 1, the objective probability of illiquidity default is
tΠL
t+1(s0,s 0)=0 .5. The only feasible REE is tπt+1 =t Πt+1 =1 , at point N in Figure 2.
Taking one et so that et <s 0, both the (illiquidity) horizontal line and the (insolvency) curve
decline. The kink in the graph of the overall probability (point P) is also sliding downwards. It
will touch the 45o line for et = s1 (with s1 <s 0), at point M on Figure 2.
6 Let S denote the event {insolvency default} and L the event {illiquidity default}. Then, the over-
all objective probability of default is written: Π =P r [ L ∪ S]=P r [ S]+P r [ L] − Pr[S ∩ L]. In this model,















Figure 2: REE and the generalized risk of default
Proposition 2 For all et ∈]s1,s 0] default is the only equilibrium outcome.
Proof. For all et ∈]s1,s 0], tΠt+1 >t πt+1 whatever tπt+1 ∈ [0,1[; the only equilibrium probability
is tΠt+1 =t πt+1 =1 . (See Figure 2)
Formally, s1 comes out as the value of et for which:
tπt+1 =t ΠL
t+1(s0,s 1)= t ΠS
t+1(tπt+1,s 1). (19)
Let us replace tπt+1 =t ΠL
t+1(s0,s 1) (such as deﬁned by equation (16)) in equation (10). It turns



















. It can be shown that s0/(1 + A) <s 1 <s 0.
So s1 can be interpreted as a new default threshold. For any et >s 1 there is no ﬁnite interest
rate for which investors agree to buy the ﬁrm’s debt at time t: the illiquidity risk brings about
an insolvency risk and, for the new interest rate, the ﬁrm would be forced to default at t +1 .
From Figure 2, it may be tempting to consider that for et = s1 an od e f a u l tR E Eo c c u r sa tp o i n t
12M; the equilibrium probability of default would be πM = ΠL(s0,s 1)=ΠS(πM,s 1). But since
s1 is a critical threshold, at date t investors must take into consideration the risk that at time
t +1the deviation et+1 might exceed s1, an event that entails default at t +1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
subjective probability πM is no longer consistent with the zero default equilibrium, given that
πM < ΠL(s1,s 1)=0 .5. This logic can now be generalized.
3.4 The generalized risk of illiquidity
For any initial threshold sn the former logic allows us to put forward a new threshold sn+1. The
latter results from the general form of condition (19):
tπt+1 =t ΠL
t+1(sn,s n+1)= t ΠS
t+1(tπt+1,s n+1). (21)












Proposition 2 may also be generalized.
Proposition 3 For a given initial threshold sn, and a new threshold sn+1 given by (22), whatever
et ∈]sn+1,s n], default is the only equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Consider et >s n+1. Then, ∀tπt+1 ∈ [tΠL
t+1(sn,e t),1[, the objective probability of insol-
vency default is bigger than the subjective probability of default: tΠt+1 =t ΠS
t+1(tπt+1,e t) >t
πt+1. The only equilibrium probability is: tπt+1 =t Πt+1 =1
It must be emphasized that the mental process which generates a threshold sn+1 is representa-
tive of the optimal decision of a generation t of investors, and this holds whatever t. Through this
mechanism, the representative investor successively eliminates all exchange rate values inconsistent
with the no default equilibrium.
Equation (22) makes it possible to deﬁne a series of thresholds (containing s0 as the ﬁrst term):










Note that the terms of S converge to ˆ s if two suﬃcient conditions jointly hold: (a) the successive
terms of the series decline and (b) none of these terms is smaller than ˆ s. As shown in the Appendix
both conditions are fulﬁlled.
13Corollary 4 For any et > ˆ s, default is the only equilibrium outcome.
Proof. By construction of ˆ s
Given the strong interaction between the risk of insolvency and the risk of illiquidity, a ﬁrm
featuring a dollar debt D will be forced to default whenever et > ˆ s. This imposes a strong constraint
on dollar leverage. To get some intuition, let us consider an interest rate i =5 %and let us assume
that at the moment when the debt has to be issued, the exchange rate matches the fundamental
value, i.e. e =1 . It comes out that the maximum sustainable debt-to-value ratio is 4.5%.7
In other words, a country which decides to increase the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate must
make sure that the dollar debt of the corporate sector producing non tradable goods is quite small.
Alternatively, if a country characterized by signiﬁcant corporate dollar debt decides to liberalize
the exchange rate, it may face an illiquidity crisis.
4C o n c l u s i o n
T h ei d e aa c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hf u l l yﬂexible exchange rate regimes might prevent ﬁnancial crises in
emerging economies is slowly catching ground, especially after the Argentinean crisis of 2002, an
event that cast major doubts about the sustainability of super-ﬁxed exchange rate systems. The
World Bank and the IMF are now urging developing countries to further increase the ﬂexibility of
their exchange rates. This advice is delivered in a speciﬁc international context: on the one hand,
the majority of developing countries from South-East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe
have removed the last controls on international movements of capital; on the other hand, the
corporate sector in these regions is running on large dollar debts.
Our analysis points out that, in this context, the liberalization of the exchange rate may entail
some unpleasant consequences. The model brings into the picture two types of risk of default: the
ﬁrst, related to insolvency, occurs when, given an unexpected currency depreciation, the ﬁrm’s
dollar income does not suﬃce to pay for interest expenses; the second risk, related to illiquidity,
emerges when investors refuse to roll over the debt. The analysis of the expectation formation
7 When λ =0 , ˆ s does not depend on the size of A.F o rλ>0 an implicit solution can be provided for ˆ s;i nt h i s
case, it can be shown that if ˆ s<1, then (dˆ s/dλ)λ=0 < 0 and if ˆ s ≥ 1, then (dˆ s/dλ)λ=0 ≥ 0.
14mechanism puts forward a strong interaction between the two risks. More precisely, a small risk
of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity. When the exchange rate is close
to its fundamental value, an equilibrium characterized by a probability of default lower than one
can be put forward only when the amount of dollar debt is very small (less than 5% of the ﬁrm
market value). According to the World Bank (2003) data, in Latin America and Eastern Europe
regions, the foreign corporate debt amounts to about 1/4 of their GDP. Hence, if governments
follow IMF advice and move fast toward increasing the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate, some of
these countries may face diﬃculties in reﬁnancing their maturing dollar debts.
These rather extreme conclusions are not independent of our basic assumptions. A closed form
solution could be obtained under the assumptions that after default the ﬁrm value becomes zero.
Allowing for partial default would have increased the sustainable debt consistent with a highly
volatile exchange rate, but would not have ruled out the illiquidity risk. A more fundamental
criticism would point to the extreme form of rationality (game-theory rationality) implied by the
model and which might not match real life adjustments. However, if in real life, equilibria based
on complete rationality seldom emerge immediately after a regulatory change, there is a neat
tendency to achieve these equilibria at the term of a more or less lengthy learning process.8
Despite its limitations, the model points to the important role played by illiquidity when
borrowers’ resources are uncertain. This factor of risk might become extremely important in the
framework of a purely ﬂexible exchange rate regime, in particular when the non-tradable sector
holds an important share in the overall economic activity. Diﬃculties faced by Brazil in ﬁnancing
its foreign debt in September 2002 despite its exemplary macroeconomic management (it run a
public surplus equal to 3% of its GDP) seem to support our analysis. At that time the real has
depreciated by 35% over the year (166% since 1999 when the ﬂoat was adopted) and only the
strong support by the IMF helped avoid the crisis. Our pessimistic conclusion might also explain
why, in the past, governments in developing countries did not let the international value of their
currency vary too much and calls for a more cautious implementation of ﬂexible exchange rates by
8 The model at hand has a similar structure with the simple repeated game where several players have to choose
a number between 0 and 10, the winner being the person closer to the half of the average number. While at the
ﬁrst round, many will choose numbers between zero and ﬁve (and even larger!), after a few rounds, all will chose
zero.
15countries which feature substantial corporate dollar debts. It suggests that governments should
pay more attention to the ratio of dollar debt to ﬁrm value in the non-tradable sector; a ceiling
on this ratio might be imposed by law.
Moral hazard considerations would not authorize international institutions to provide easy
money to insolvent governments. In the light of the model, international ﬁnancial organizations
may nevertheless have a useful role in ﬁnancing those developing countries which are solvent but
subject to an illiquidity crisis. However, the model points to the deeply intricate relationship be-
tween insolvency and illiquidity risks. This would explain why the IMF is facing major diﬃculties
in disentangling the two types of risk (Rajan, 2005); such a technical diﬃculty might prevent them
from taking the right actions.
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